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Chapter 1:
The Industrial Revolution was a Great Tide
 
Two centuries ago the world’s economy stood at the present level of Chad or 
Bangladesh.  In those good old days of 1800, further, on past form the average 
person in Norway or Japan would have had less rational hope than a Chadian or 
Bangladeshi does nowadays of seeing in a couple of generations the end of such 
poverty.  In 1800 the average human consumed in modern-day prices, fully 
corrected for exchange rates, roughly $3 a day, give or take a dollar or two.2  That’s 
$3 a day in present money to live now in, say, Los Angeles.  The only people much 
better off than the $3 average were lords or bishops or some few of the merchants.  It 
had been this way for all of history, and for that matter all of pre-history.  With her 
$3 the typical denizen of the earth could eat a few pound of potatoes, a little milk, 
very occasionally a scrap of meat.  A wool shawl.  A year or two of elementary 
education, if exceptionally lucky.  At birth she had a 50-50 chance of dying before 
she was 30 years old.  Perhaps she was a cheerful sort, and was “happy” with 
illiteracy, disease, superstition, periodic starvation, and lack of prospects.  After all, 
2   Strictly speaking, “1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars”—so I’ve inflated a bit (using the consumer price 
index in the USA since 1991) to bring the figures in a rough and ready way up to 2008 prices in the United States. 
That is, the $3 is to be understood as what you would live on in Chicago, say, in 2008 if you had the misfortune of 
the world’s average real income in 1800.  The figures were estimated by Angus Maddison in his amazing palace 
of numbers, The World Economy (2006), these particular numbers on p. 642.  For “two centuries ago” I used the 
average of Maddison’s world figures for 1700 and 1820.  Economic historians agree on a factor of ten or so since 
the eighteenth century: for example, Easterlin 1995 (2004), p. 84.
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she had her family and faith and community, which interfered with every choice she 
made.  But anyway she was desperately poor, and narrowly limited in human scope.
Two centuries later the world supports more than six-and-half times more 
people.  Yet contrary to a pessimistic Malthusian expectation that population growth 
would be the big problem, the average person today earns and consumes almost ten 
times more goods and services than in 1800.  Real income per person in the world 
has recently been doubling every generation, and is accelerating.  Starvation 
worldwide therefore is at an all-time low, and falling.  Literacy and life expectancy 
are at all-time highs, and rising.  Liberty is spreading.  Slavery is retreating, as is a 
patriarchy enslaving of women.  In the richer countries, such as Norway, the 
average person earns fully 45 times more than in 1800, a startling $137 a day.  The 
environment—a concern of a well-to-do bourgeoisie—is in such rich places 
improving. 
True, some whole countries, and many people even in rapidly growing places 
like India remain terribly poor.  The constitute a “bottom billion,” thankfully 
shrinking, condemned for the present to the $3 that had been the human condition 
since the African savannah.  Some hundreds of millions live on a bare dollar.3  And 
many are literal slaves, or women held in slavish ignorance.  But the share of the 
terribly poor and the terribly unfree in world population is now falling faster than at 
any time in history.  World population growth has in fact been decelerating since the 
3   The “bottom billion” is Paul Collier’s phrase (Collier 2007).  The Norwegian ratio to average entire-world gross 
national income per capita in 2006 (at purchasing power parity: adjusting for the cost of living) was 5.4 (according 
to World Bank 2008, pp. 8, 161).  And relative to the average of low income countries by World-Bank definitions 
the ratio was 27, that is, $137 a day compared with the low-income average of $5 a day (World Bank 2008, p. 10).
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1970s, and in a generation or so will start falling.4  In fifty years, if things go as they 
have since 1800, the terribly poor will have become adequately nourished.  Slaves 
and women will be free.  And the ordinarily person worldwide will have become 
bourgeois.  
In a good deal of the world it has already happened.  Marx was vexed by the 
bourgeois character of the American working class.  But it turned out that the 
prosperous Americans were merely showing the way for the British and the French 
and the Japanese.  The universal class into which we are merging is not the 
revolutionary proletariat but the innovative bourgeoisie.  Bring to mind, oh dear 
bourgeois-by-education reader, the poverty of your own ancestors a few generations 
back.  In 2007 the economist Paul Collier observed that for decades “the 
development challenge has [been thought of as] a rich world of one billion people 
facing a poor world of five billion people. . . .  It will be apparent that this way of 
conceptualizing development has become outdated.  Most of the five billion, about 
80 percent, live in counties that are indeed developing, often at amazing speed.” 
That’s right.  Witness China and India nowadays, growing in real income per head 
at amazing, unprecedented speeds, twice or three times faster than other countries---
7 to 10 percent per year, implying a quadrupling of human scope every 20 or 14 
years.  The fact provides some scientific ideas about what to do for the bottom 
billion or so.  But Collier also says that “since 1980 world poverty has been falling for  
the first time in history.”  That’s wrong (though perhaps he means the sheer numbers 
4   Maddison 2006, p. 615.
10
of poor people).  Certainly as a share of all the world’s population the world’s 
poverty has been falling not for two decades but for two centuries.  Witness Norway 
and Japan, once $3 poor.  The two centuries of history provides some scientific ideas 
about how we got here and where we are going.5
The last two centuries favored the ordinary person, and especially a person 
who lived in a bourgeois country.  Consider a third cousin once removed of mine, 
35-year old Hedda Stuland, in Dimelsvik on the Hardanger Fjord of western 
Norway.  In 1800 our mutual ancestors had been miserably poor.  See Chad.  Yet by 
now the honest, oil-rich, and educated Norwegians have the second highest average 
income in the world.  Expressed in American prices of 2006 it is fully $50,000 a year 
per head.  (Tiny Luxembourg ranks first out of 209 countries at $60,000 a head; 
closed-citizenship Kuwait ranks third at $48,000; and the big U.S.A. lumbers along at 
merely fourth, $44,000 a head—which is nonetheless a stunning increase over 1900 
or 1950.)6  Fru Stuland consumes with her $137 a day a good deal of Belgian 
chocolate and a nice little Audi and a summer home in the mountains.   She and the 
rest of the Norwegians work fewer hours per year than the citizens of other OECD 
countries, and many fewer hours than the workaholics in Japan or the USA.  At birth 
she could have expected to live to age 85.  Her own two children will probably live 
even longer, and certainly will be even better off financially than she is, unless they 
decide on careers in fine arts or charitable works—in which case the satisfactions 
5   Collier 2007, pp. 3, x.
6   Again the figures are at (U.S.A.) purchasing-power parity, from World Bank 2008.
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from such sacred careers amount to income.7  Norway contributes more to 
international, governmental charities per capita than any other country.  Hedda 
supports non-violent, democratic institutions.  She graduated from the University of 
Bergen, studying mathematics.  She works as an actuary in an insurance company, 
getting six weeks of paid vacation a year in Sicily or Florida.  Her husband Olaf 
(who is by no means her lord and master) worked as a diver on the oil rigs for a few 
years, but now is desk-bound at the oil company’s regional office.  As a girl at school 
Hedda read many of the works of Ibsen in Norwegian, and some even of 
Shakespeare in English.  She’s been pleased to attend performances of both at the 
National Theatre in Oslo over the mountains.  Her home resonates with the music of 
Edvard Grieg, who in fact was a not-so-distant relative on her mother’s side.8
Why did it happen?  How did average income in the world move from $3 to 
$30 a day?  How did Norwegians move from being poor and sick and marginally 
free and largely ignorant to being rich and healthy and entirely free and largely 
educated?  
The main point of this book is that the leaps, such as Norway’s from $3 to 
$137, with its cultural and political accompaniments, did not happen mainly because 
of the usual economics.  That is, they did not happen because of Dutch investments 
or European trade or British imperialism or the exploitation of sailors on Norwegian 
ships.  Economics did matter in shaping the pattern.  It usually does.  Exactly who 
benefited and exactly what was produced, and exactly when and where, was indeed 
7   Abbing 2003.
8   Hedda is a fiction—though in truth I have plenty of such cousins at Dimelsvik.
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a matter of economics.  If the historians don’t know the economics they will not 
understand the pattern of modern history.  The pattern was shaped by the trade in 
cotton and the investments in seaports, by the supply of steam engines and the 
demand for elementary education, by the cost of iron and the benefit of railways, by 
the plantation exploitation of slaves and the market participation of women. 
Economics of a material sort can surely explain why Americans burned wood and 
charcoal longer than did the forest-poor and coal-rich people of inner northwestern 
Europe, or why education was a bad investment for a British parlor maid in 1840, or 
why the United States rather than Egypt supplied most of the raw cotton to 
Manchester, or why indeed the cotton growers of the present-day African Sahel are 
damaged by protection for American cotton.  Economics can explain why 
comparative advantage in making cotton cloth shifted from India to England and 
then back to India.  
But economics can’t explain the rise in the whole world’s (absolute) 
advantage from $3 to $30 a day.  It can’t explain the onset or the continuation, in its 
magnitude as against its pattern, of the uniquely modern—the coming of elections, 
computers, tolerance, antibiotics, frozen pizza, central heating, and higher education 
for the masses, such as for you and me and Hedda.  If the economists don’t know 
the history they will not understand this most important of modern historical 
events.  That is, economics of a conventional sort does not account for the great size 
and egalitarian spread of the benefit from growth, as against the fine details of its 
pattern.  Material, economic forces were not the original and sustaining causes of the 
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modern rise, 1800 to the present, accelerating after 1980.  Economics does most 
elegantly explain how the rising tide expressed itself in micro-geographical detail, 
channeled into this or that inlet, mixing with the river just so far upstream, lapping 
the dock to such-and-such a height.  But the tide itself had other causes.
What then?  I argue here, and in complementary ways in the two volumes to 
follow, that talk and ethics and ideas caused the Industrial Revolution.  Ethical talk 
runs the world.  One-quarter of national income is earned from sweet talk in 
markets and management.9  Rhetoric matters.  Perhaps economics and its many 
good friends should acknowledge the fact.  When they don’t they get into trouble, as 
when they inspire banks to ignore professional talk and fiduciary ethics and to use 
only silent and monetary incentives (executive compensation, say).  
In particular, three centuries ago in places like Holland and England the talk 
about the middle class began to alter.  That was the big change.  (Unfortunately it 
didn’t alter at the same time in China or India or the Ottoman Empire.)  The North-
Sea talk at length radically altered the culture and the politics and the economy.  In 
northwestern Europe around 1700 the general opinion shifted, rather suddenly as 
such things go.  There was a big change in what Alexis de Tocqueville called “habits 
of the mind”—or more exactly, habits of the lip.  People stopped sneering at market 
innovativeness and other bourgeois virtues exercised far from the traditional places 
of honor at St. Peter’s or Versailles or the First Battle of Breitenfeld.  
9   McCloskey and Klamer 1995.
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(To speak for a moment to my economist colleagues, economists save their 
models in the face of such a radical alteration by speaking of “nonlinearities” or 
“economies of scale” or “multiple equilibria.”  I am claiming that the economy 
exploded because the forms of speech about enterprise and invention suddenly 
changed, for various good and interesting reasons.  Speech, not material changes in 
foreign trade or domestic investment, caused the non-linearities.  We know this in 
part because trade or investment were ancient routines, but the new dignity and 
liberty for ordinary people were unique to the age.)  
The change was of greater importance for explaining the modern world than 
the clerical Reformation in Germany after 1517, or even the aristocratic Renaissance 
during and after the Tuscan Trecento, though both of these influenced it, as did a 
third great R-shift of late medieval and early modern times, the political Revolts and 
Revolutions which shook Holland and Britain and America and finally France.  But 
the point here is that in a fourth great and uniquely European R-shift—the 
“Bourgeois Revaluation” in Holland and Britain—an old class began to acquire a 
new and higher standing in the way people talked about it, in their rhetoric.
 Faith is the virtue of backward looking, of having an identity.  Dignity 
encourages faith.  You are dignified in standing.  Hope by contrast is the virtue of 
forward looking, of having a project.10  Liberty encourages hope.  You are free to 
venture.  The claim is that the dignity to stand in ones place and the liberty to 
venture made the modern world.  Both were new and necessary.  My libertarian 
10   A full defense of this and the other categories of virtues is given in McCloskey 2006a, especially pp. 151-194.
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friends want liberty alone to suffice.  But it seems that it did not.  Both dignity and 
liberty were necessary---though of course the one normally supports the other. 
Liberty without dignity makes for activity without faithful self-esteem, the eager but 
lowly and self-despising niggling of the marketplace.  And dignity without liberty 
makes for status without hope, merely another version of the hierarchy of olden 
times.  The Revaluation of the honorable transcendent, no longer confined to 
heroism or saintliness or courtly grace, was a change in sociology and politics.  By 
contrast, what Tocqueville called the psychological “habits of the heart” did not 
change much.  The important change was not psychological (as for example Max 
Weber argued in 1905), or economic (as Marx argued in 1848), but sociological and 
political.  Only by consequence were they economic.  
Around 1600, that is, on a big scale in pioneering Holland, and then around 
1700 on a bigger scale in innovating Britain, some of the elite began to Revalue the 
town and its vulgar and corrosive if liberty-using creativity.  By the 1660s the Dutch 
cloth merchant Pieter de la Court was declaring that “a power of using their natural 
rights and properties for their own safety . . . will be to the commonalty. . . an 
earthly paradise: for the liberty of a man’s own mind, especially about matters 
wherein all his welfare consists, is to such a one as acceptable as an empire or 
kingdom.”11  No aristocratic empires or kingdoms, please.  In 1690 an English 
merchant to the Ottomans, Dudley North (himself from an aristocratic family), 
wrote in a more modern and economistic way that “there can be no trade 
11   De la Court 1669.
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unprofitable to the public, for if any prove so, men leave it off; and wherever the 
traders thrive, the public, of which they are a part, thrives also.”12  
Such pro-market opinions were never universal.  The British elite took a 
century or more to begin speaking of commercial creativity as O.K., acceptable, not-
to-be-sneered-at.  And anti-commercial snobbery in Britain did not entirely end, 
ever.  The liberty half of the Revaluation was equally (and more famously) slow in 
coming.  And therefore the domination of British politics by an Establishment did 
not entirely end, ever.  As the historian Margaret Jacob argued long ago, and as 
Jonathan Israel has confirmed lately in the history of ideas, the free-market and free-
voting “radical Enlightenment” of people like the Levellers, de la Court, Spinoza, 
Mandeville, Paine, and the well-named Freemasons was undercut by the more 
conservative and monarchical Enlightenment of Locke, Newton, Voltaire, and the 
rest, in the utter liberty of trade that the radicals sometimes favored among others 
matters.13  We continue to fight such battles.  And at the time both the radical and 
the conservative Enlightenment of course were fiercely opposed by the reactionary 
powers, with galley and with rope.  
The historian of technology Christine MacLeod dates the final apotheosis of 
the inventor in Britain to the early nineteenth century.  Certainly the shift in rhetoric 
beginning in the seventeenth century needed constant tending, as ideologies do. 
12   North 1691, Preface, p. viii.  I have modernized spelling and punctuation here and elsewhere, to avoid 
distancing the authors.  Stephen Greenblatt praises the Oxford edition's (1986) modernizing of Shakespeare's 
spelling for avoiding "a certain cozy, Olde-English quaintness" (Greenblatt 1997, p. 73).  The distance of the olde 
ffolke should depend on their thoughts, not their spelling conventions.  For the same reason I have changed 
British spellings to American, "honour" to "honor"  and the like.  Sometimes I cannot resist retaining "-eth" in 16th-
century quotations.  It's so cozy and quaint.
13   Jacob 1981 (2006); Israel 2001.
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MacLeod tells for example of the remarkable campaign to put by 1834 a big statue of 
the inventor James Watt (in Westminster Abbey, in among the kings and priests and 
poets.  A contemporary asked in vexation “what this vast figure represents, what 
class of interests before unknown [well, hardly ‘unknown’], what revolution in the 
whole framework of modern society.”14  He was behind the curve.  MacLeod notes 
that the Times as early as April 22, 1826 had declared that inventors were “the elect 
of the human race.”15  She detects during the 1830s “a marked alteration in the 
attitudes of judges and juries towards patentees. . . .  The balance of success in 
litigation shifted towards prosecutors of infringements, as patentees began to be 
regarded less as grasping monopolists [of Elizabethan date, for example], and more 
as national benefactors,” sixty years after Adam Smith had fully articulated the 
case.16
Such dignity for innovation and liberty for enterprise are sometimes still 
opposed—which along with a bad climate and a bad start is why some countries 
remain poor.  True, if supporters of subsidies to American cotton growers were 
capable of shame, eastern Burkina Faso and the rest of the Sahel would do better. 
Ethical failures in the global North contribute in part to keeping such places poor. 
Yet even with a bad climate and a bad start and an unethical policy in the North of 
protecting its own rich farmers, such places do not have to remain poor.  When a 
stable though tyrannical country like China or a turbulent though law-governed 
14   Dean Stanley 1834, quoted in MacLeod 1998, p. 96.
15   MacLeod 1998, p. 108.
16   MacLeod 1998, p. 108.
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country like India started to revalue markets and innovation, and to give a partial 
liberty to commerce, the food and housing and education for the average person 
began doubling every 10 to 7 years.  In a couple of generations China and India will 
have Hedda’s standard of living.  They have already entered Collier’s Top 5½ 
Billions.  An internal ethical change allowed it, beginning in northwestern Europe 
after 1700.
It wasn’t “capitalism” that was new in 1700.  Markets and non-agricultural 
property and a town-living middle class to manage them are very old.  The market 
economy, contrary to what you might have heard, has existed since the caves.  The 
invention of full language around 50,000 B.C.E. shows up archaeologically for 
example in a big and sudden increase in the distance traveled by stone for tools, 
such as flint or obsidian, scores of miles in trade instead of the former few.  So it 
went, for millennia.  “Back at least as far as the third millennium B.C.E.,” writes the 
economic historian George Grantham, “farmers on some islands in the Aegean Sea 
were producing olive oil and wine in amounts greatly exceeding domestic 
consumption requirements.”17  Walled towns arose with the invention of agriculture, 
since 8000 B.C.E. in Jericho for example.  For millennia afterwards the towns 
proliferated, with their markets and bourgeoisies and enterprises.  From the 
beginning the townsfolk appear to have had pretty much the same psychological 
makeup as the modern bourgeoisie—they wanted profits, they believed that 
arranging for monopolies by corrupting the government was the best way to attain 
17   Grantham 2003, p. 73.
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them, but they were willing to innovate if forced by competition and enabled by 
cooperation.  They only awaited the sociological and political Bourgeois Revaluation 
in northwestern Europe to commence innovating on an immense scale.  
Nor of course was innovation entirely novel in 1700.  People had always been 
creative in making arrowheads or wooden ships.  An Upper Paleolithic burst of 
creativity in making tools and ornaments and musical instruments is another sign of 
the invention of fully modern language.18  The Taiwanese natives, originally from 
China, appear to have invented the outrigger canoe around 3500 B.C.E., and went on 
to populate the Pacific.  The Indo-Europeans of Ukraine appear to have 
domesticated the horse around 4000 B.C.E., and went on to conquer or repopulate or 
inspire Europe, Iran, and much of South Asia.  But until 1800 C.E. the innovation 
had allowed expansion of humans merely in numbers and ecological range, or the 
replacement of one culture by another.  For Malthusian reasons it had done nothing 
to change the $3-day life.  Nothing at all.  The anthropologist Marshall Sahlins 
argued long ago, and persuasively, that the “stone-age economics” of hunter-
gatherers allowed people to work many fewer hours than agriculture did.19  Yet 
cultivating fields of grain did bring cities and temples and then literacy.  It was a 
tradeoff, sparsely populated hunting grounds traded off for dense cities.  But either 
choice left the scope of the average human unchanged—for most people: poor, 
illiterate, short-lived.  What was different after 1800, and with unstoppable force 
18   Kuhn, Stiner, and others 2001: they speak of the emergence over a wide area rather suddenly of “redundant, 
standardized ornament forms” suggesting communicative purposes.  Earlier art was rare, and unique in design.
19   Sahlins 1974 (2004), esp. Chp. 2, “The Domestic Mode of Production: The Structure of Underproduction.”
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after 1900, was a novel and immense and sustained, almost lunatic, scale of 
innovation, breaking the Malthusian curse.  For the first time the innovations made 
ordinary people far richer than the ancient standard of hunter-gatherer or nomadic 
herder or settled farmer, and allowed the moderns to have smaller families.  Think 
about your ancestors, and compare.
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Chapter 2:
The Tide Came from a New Dignity and a New Liberty
for the Ordinary Bourgeoisie and Its Innovations.
Innovation depends, as the economist and rabbi Israel Kirzner has argued, on 
alertness.20  The big or small entrepreneur, encouraged by dignity and enabled by 
liberty, alertly notices an opportunity, and takes it.  To have socially good effects the 
alertness cannot be of the monopolizing sort the ancient bourgeoisie admired, or of 
which the Tammany Hall politician George Washington Plunkett spoke of in 1905: 
“There's an honest graft, and I'm an example of how it works.  I might sum up the 
whole thing by sayin': ‘I seen my opportunities and I took 'em’."21  Such 
“opportunities” to extract bribes out of a government-enforced monopoly at best 
shuffle the community’s income from the taxpayer to Plunkett.  More likely in the 
process they reduce it.  And modern protectionism, such as the sort Frédéric Bastiat 
spoofed in 1845 in his petition of the candle makers against the light of the sun, 
certainly does reduce the community’s income, by putting people in less productive 
jobs.22  Bastiat’s funniest example is the “negative railroad.”  A railroad was 
20   For example, Kirzner 1976, p. 83, as elsewhere in his writings, and especially Kirzner 1973.  I have criticized his 
very fruitful approach, though, as not going quite far enough: as not recognizing the importance of the social 
aspect of entrepreneurship, and especially the role of conversation (McCloskey 2008e; compare Storr 2008).
21  W. L. Riordon, Plunkitt of Tammany Hall (1905),  pp. 3-10, reproduced in Leland D. Baldwin," The Flavor Of The 
Past Readings in American Social and Political Portrait Life", Vol.II (New York: Van Nostrand, 1968), pp.57-60, and 
then at http://www.uhb.fr/faulkner/ ny/plunkitt.htm
22   Bastiat 1845, I.7.
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proposed from Paris to Madrid.  The city of Bordeaux demanded that the railroad 
break there, which would “create jobs” for porters and hotels and taxis (London, 
Chicago, and Paris itself have long had precisely such arrangements, extracted by 
politics and monopoly: in the United States in the railway age they always said 
“Change in Chicago”).  Bastiat noted that by such “job-creating” logic every town 
along the route should see its opportunity and take it.  “Change Ablon-sur-Seine, 
Evry, Ballancourt-sur-Essonne, La Ferté-Alais.”  Every few kilometers, at every 
country village, the railroad would end at a Gare du Nord to be resumed after job-
creating expenditure by travelers and freight handlers at a Gare du Sud.  All the 
national income of France and Spain would come to be “generated” by the railroad, 
at the cost of all other forms of production.  It would be a negative railroad, a 
triumph of protectionism and industrial planning achieved through what 
economists call “rent seeking.”  
But if the opportunity is an actual improvement in how things are provided—
rather than one of the rent-seeking opportunities for legalized theft in which the old 
aristocracy and priesthood had so long specialized, and in which the new 
democratic politicians also came to be skilled—then the society is made better off. 
Move the marketplace to a more convenient location.  Buy Greek olive oil at a low 
price to sell high.  Invent the container ship.  Discover E = mc2.  
Yet such inventive activities, especially in towns, had always been scorned by 
the elite.  After all, the elite lived by the dignified collection of rents or taxes 
imposed on mere workers.  A middleman improving life by purchasing a bolt of 
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cloth or an idea for an invention at a low price and selling it at a higher price to 
people who valued it more seemed to them a mere trickster.  In 44 B.C.E. Cicero 
declared that “commerce, if on a small scale, is to be regarded as vulgar; but if large 
and rich. . . it is not so very discreditable. . . . if the merchant, . . . contented with his 
profits, . . . betakes himself from the port itself to an estate in the country.”23  In 1516 
the blast by Thomas More—or, rather, by his character Raphael Hythloday 
[“peddler of nonsense”: More was for a long time canny in making his own position 
ambiguous]—can stand for the abuse directed for millennia at the vulgar traders 
and innovators of the towns: “They think up . . . all ways and means . . . of keeping 
what they have heaped up through underhanded deals, and then of taking 
advantage of the poor by buying their labor and toil as cheaply as possible. . . . 
These depraved creatures, in their insatiable greed, . . . are still very far from the 
happiness of the Utopian commonwealth [where] once the use of money was 
abolished, and together with it all greed for it, what a mass of troubles was cut 
away!”24  The Earl of Leicester, sent by Elizabeth in the 1580s to meddle in the 
politics of the already bourgeois Dutch, did not trouble to conceal his contempt for 
the “Sovereign Lords Miller and Cheeseman” with whom he had to deal.25  And 
even the commercial Dutch had a proverb, Een laugen is koopmans welvaart,  “A lie is 
a merchant’s prosperity.”
23   Cicero 44 B.C.E., I:42.  Compare Finley 1973, pp. 60, 23.
24   More 1516, p. 132.
25   Israel 1995, p. 222.
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But after 1700 in Britain, as earlier in Holland, the vulgarities of the economy 
and of money and of dealing, with their disturbing creativity, came gradually to be 
talked about as non-corrupting.  They began to be seen as worthy of a certain 
respect, as being not hopelessly vulgar or sinful or underhanded.  In a word, they 
became dignified.  The very idea of virtue and dignity in (of all places) the economy
—even in small-scale commerce, or buying grain low to sell high, or making cheese
—had been proposed tentatively by professors in Italy and Spain and France.  In the 
mid-thirteenth century St. Thomas  of Aquino himself had written in the style of his 
ancient and anti-bourgeois authorities, especially of the desert monks and of 
Aristotle the teacher of aristocrats, that “trading, considered in itself, has a certain 
debasement attaching thereto, in so far as, by its very nature, it does not imply a 
virtuous or necessary end.”26  But Thomas and the other urban monks of his time 
wrestled against the inherited style: “Nevertheless gain which is the end of trading, 
though not implying, by its nature, anything virtuous or necessary, does not, in 
itself, connote anything sinful or contrary to virtue: wherefore nothing prevents gain 
from being directed to some necessary or even virtuous end, and thus trading 
becomes lawful.  Thus, for instance, a man may intend the moderate gain which he 
seeks to acquire by trading for the upkeep of his household.”  
No one in charge in Florence or Barcelona after 1200 actually thought that 
commerce was immoral—they left such primitive notions to the country folk of the 
North.  Yet eventually in the North-Sea lands during the seventeenth and especially 
26  Aquinas 1251-1273, Second Part of the Second Part, Question 77, Art. 4, “I answer that.”
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during the eighteenth century many of the clerisy of artists and intellectuals, and 
even a few churchmen and aristocrats, came to tolerate and in a small way to admire 
the bourgeoisie.  Towards 1800 many ordinary Europeans, and towards 1900 still 
more Europeans, and then towards 2000 many ordinary people elsewhere, came to 
accept the outcome of the market with more or less good grace.  As Christine 
MacLeod puts it, by the standard of the “aristocratic cultural hegemony” of earlier 
times “the inventor was an improbable hero,” but by the middle of the nineteenth 
century in Britain the inventor had become just that.27  The Dutch, then the British, 
then the Americans, and then many other people for the first time on a big scale 
looked with favor on the market economy, and even on the creative destruction 
coming from its profitable innovations.  American westerns praised bourgeois 
cattlemen.28  Japanese salarymen became heroes of novels.  The world began to 
revalue the bourgeois towns.  In 2005 the francophone English writer Alain de 
Botton spoke of his boring home town, Zurich, whose “distinctive lesson to the 
world lies in its ability to remind us of how truly imaginative and humane it can be 
to ask of a city that it be nothing other than boring and bourgeois.”  He quotes 
Montaigne, writing in the last decades of the sixteenth century:
27  MacLeod 2007, pp. 1, 13.  MacLeod detects a decline in the prestige of inventors by the early twentieth century, 
but I would argue that by then the heroism had been routinized.  In A. G. Macdonnell’s comic novel England,  
Their England (1933) the engineer character, William Rhodes, is still to be admired, though suspect from an 
English upper class point of view (Macdonnell was a Scot).  MacLeod’s argument, admittedly, is about inventors 
in the strict sense, not the users of inventions.  Yet as Edgerton (1996 and 2005) argues, Britain remains, for all the 
post-Victorian lament, one of the most inventive economies on earth.
28   For a discussion of the bourgeois tendency of the cowboy novel and film, and its tensions, see McCloskey 2006a, 
pp. 212-230. 
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Storming a breech, conducting an embassy, ruling a nation are glittering 
deeds.  [But] rebuking, laughing, buying, selling, loving, hating, and living 
together gently and justly with your household—and with yourself. . . —is 
something more difficult.  Whatever people may say, such secluded lives 
sustain in that way duties which are at least as hard and tense as those of 
other lives.29 
Note that the event in question is not a “rise of the middle class,” if by that is 
meant a coming of an enlarged bourgeoisie to political power.  Outside the British 
North American colonies the step was long delayed.  The middle class, as Jack 
Hexter pointed out long ago, is always “rising,” and yet only lately has gotten there 
in England —it hadn’t, really, even in the nineteenth century, and certainly hadn’t in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.30  The event in early modern times is rather 
a Revaluation of bourgeois behavior, an increased acceptance of bourgeois virtues, 
the rebuking, laughing, buying, selling far from glittering deeds.  As the historian 
Joyce Oldham Appleby put it in 1978, speaking of the late seventeenth century aand 
after, the middle class in England “coalesced with, rather than displaced, the 
existing ruling class. . . .  Social change. . . requires not a new class but a modern 
class, however formed.”31   In Holland, first, and then in England and then the rest, it 
happened.
29   Montaigne 1588, Bk. III, 2, “Of Repentance,” quoted Botton 2005, p. 46; alternatively translated at p. 614 of D. 
Frame, ed. and trans. (Stanford University Press 1958).
30  Hexter 1961.
31  Appleby 1978, pp. 11-12.
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The market and the bourgeoisie in the Revaluing countries repaid the 
compliment with a stunning enrichment.  By their innovation and their competition 
for customers in markets, acting for the first time within a social drama in which 
they enjoyed dignity and liberty, they increased the welfare of the poor in Britain 
and then elsewhere at first by 100 percent and at length by 900 percent, then 1500 
percent, then beyond, up to that $137 a day.  It is happening now even in Egypt.  
Some of the enrichment was win-win, a “creative accumulation,” as the 
economic historian Nick von Tunzelmann puts it.  Think of the hula hoop or the 
skate board, new products with no close substitutes to be damaged by the novelty. 
Yet most changes do damage some people—from “creative destruction,” in the 
phrase of Werner Sombart’s (1863-1941) made famous by Joseph Schumpeter (1883-
1950).  Win-lose is usual.  Think of the new fold-up-and-carry canvas lawn chairs, 
which once sold for $40 and now for $6, which have bankrupted companies making 
the older aluminum chairs.  They in turn had bankrupted the old wooden folding 
deck chairs, which in turn had bankrupted the still older Adirondack non-folding 
wooden chairs.  Chicago prospers mightily, and windily proclaims its might, and so 
St. Louis comparatively does not.  Steam puts waterpower out of business, slowly. 
Buggy whips lose their appeal.  WalMart cheapens goods to the poor but drives 
local monopolies in retailing out of business.  
Creative destruction is not only economic.  If innovating in the production of 
sugar or the organization of corporations creates some losers as well as a lot of 
winners, so do most artistic or intellectual innovations.  Charlie Parker and Dizzy 
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Gillespie put out of business many a jazzman of the Age of Swing, as Swing had put 
out of business Dixieland, and Dixieland had put out of business Ragtime.  Coco 
Chanel bankrupted many a dressmaker of the older sort.  Albert Einstein made 
obsolete the many physicists who believed that the universe in the large was 
Euclidian and Newtonian (and shortly afterwards Niels Bohr and Werner 
Heisenberg and their quantum mechanics made Einstein’s mature thinking 
obsolete).  It is not true that free trade in goods or art or ideas helps every single 
person.  
But the fact of destruction somewhere does not make free trade in goods or 
ideas a bad thing.  The accounting is commonly: win-win-win-win-win-lose.  Or so 
the new bourgeois liberalism claimed, contrary to the zero-sum notions that had 
governed the world up to then, in which every gain to Europe was supposed to have 
arisen from a comparable loss to the rest.  Win minus lose equals zero.  No, said the 
liberals like John Stuart Mill, not usually.  
The win-win-win-win-win-lose calculation is known in philosophy as “act” 
(or direct) utilitarianism: the balance of social gain to some innovation is claimed to 
be positive, taking winners with losers and adding them up (somehow).   At the 
same time, however, an alternative argument was developed, by Mill: rule (or 
indirect) utilitarianism.32  Each act of buying or innovating may have losers.  Indeed, 
32   Mill 1843: “There are many virtuous actions, and even virtuous modes of action (though the cases are, I think, 
less frequent than is often supposed) by which happiness in the particular instance is sacrificed, more pain being 
produced than pleasure. But conduct of which this can be truly asserted, admits of justification only because it 
can be shown that on the whole more happiness will exist in the world, if feelings are cultivated which will make 
people, in certain cases, regardless of happiness” [VI.xii.7].  Twenty years later, in Utilitarianism, he had much 
more to say along the same lines.
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unless the item has no alternative buyer or employment, it must: if I buy a Picasso I 
am literally taking it away from someone.  The price he faces for substitutes for “Man 
with a Blue Guitar” rises.  If he has a veto on my purchase, he will surely exercise it. 
A society in which literally everyone has to agree to such a change in how things are 
allocated among him and me will not be progressive technologically (or artistically 
or intellectually or spiritually or in any other way).  
What Mill and Sidgwick and other sophisticated utilitarians saw is that if we 
instead make our ethical and political decisions not at the level of acts but at the 
level of rule-making about acts we can avoid the win-lose logic of allocation, and 
avoid, too, certain other and more dramatic paradoxes in act utilitarianism.  We 
choose to abide by the market’s equilibrium, for example, or we choose to abide by 
democratic rule, or we choose to abide by the amiable political fiction that all people 
are equal—and the outcome will be good (Mill was still a consequentialist in ethics). 
Mill’s ploy undergirds what the economist James Buchanan calls “constitutional 
political economy.”  “If politics is conceptualized as a two-stage or two-level process 
(the constitutional [or rule] and the post-constitutional [or act]). . . the agreement 
criterion . . . [has] more acceptable implications.”33  It is what Buchanan and Gordon 
Tullock were about when they posited in The Calculus of Consent (1962) a veil of 
uncertainty concerning which side of the market or the vote one will end up on, 
behind which one makes constitutional rules.  It is also what John Rawls was about 
33   Buchanan 2006, p. 991.
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in his later A Theory of Justice (1971) when he imagined a pre-natal veil of ignorance 
behind which we decide whether our society will have slavery or not.  
To the economist, the lower level, act utilitarianism has its charms.  She points 
out that if the price of lumber is higher in England than in Sweden then shipping 
Swedish lumber from Norrland to London creates value, by the amount of the price 
difference less the transaction costs.  An innovation in lumber manufacturing or 
organization can be seen as the same sort of alert arbitrage, buying an idea for 
lumber ships or steel saws low and selling it high.  Again the gain in value is the 
price difference.  Sven Svenson the Swedish lumber king is made better off, as is 
Jones the lumber merchant in London—and his employees and customers are made 
better off, too.  True, if Sweden exports lumber some people are hurt.  The price of 
lumber from Sussex in southern England, which is a substitute for Swedish lumber, 
goes down, and the fall in price will measure the loss to Wrightman, the owner of a 
big stand of timber in Sussex.  And back in Sweden Jon Jonson, the competing 
lumber duke, is certainly made worse off by King Svenson’s success.  He is very 
unhappy about it, and would veto it if he could.
But the economic logic is that the act of taking advantage of a price difference, 
moving stuff from low-valued uses to high-valued uses, creates a net and national 
gain in value-in-use (which appears as an uptick in national income).  People 
benefitting from the original low-valued use are hurt, but more people (weighted by 
purchasing power) are helped—the price they pay falls.  Other suppliers of lumber 
or any substitute for lumber are hurt.  The demanders of any complement such as 
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houses made with wood are helped.  It looks complicated.  But on a blackboard the 
economist can show you that under certain assumptions the net gain to national 
income is always positive.  As Bastiat said at the dawn of confidence in laissez faire 
arguments, “what I save by paying nothing to the sun [for indoor illumination in the 
day time], I use for buying clothing, furniture, and [even] candles.”34  It is all quite 
simple, the economist says—unless, she concedes with a certain embarrassment, 
“second-best” considerations or “non-convexities” intervene, or unless you do not 
approve ethically of weighting people by purchasing power.35  
Blackboard proofs and their uneasy assumption of first-best and amoral 
income distribution aside, though, the historical facts speak loudly enough.  Clearly, 
some people are hurt by economic change, every time, just as some people are hurt 
by intellectual change or fashion change or climate change.  But equally clearly the 
gain since 1800 from economic change has massively outweighed the loss to English 
woodmen disemployed by Swedish timber, or American blacksmiths disemployed 
by automobiles, or Indian bullock-drivers disemployed by motor trucks.  The Win-
Win-Win-Win-Wins far outnumber the Lose.  To put it in terms of constitutional 
political economy, what sort of society would you rather be born into: one that 
forbad every innovation that resulted in any loss whatever to someone, and rested at 
$3 a day, or one that allowed innovation, perhaps with a social safety net like 
Norway’s, and resulted in $137 a day?
34   Bastiat 1845, II.15.33.
35   E .g. McCloskey 1985b, sections 9.2, 10.2, 10.3, 24.1.
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That’s why it is scientifically important to grasp the great magnitude of 
modern economic growth.  When the value created is merely the modest efficiency 
gains noted in the nineteenth century by the classical British economists one might 
reasonably stand in doubt, and slip into conservative, protectionist measures 
(though the blackboard, I say, still provides the uneasy proof of net gain from free 
trade).  But when the value created is a factor of 10—a movement from $3 to $30, not 
to speak of $3 to $137—it becomes impossible to argue that the loss to the substitutes 
(other suppliers of lumber, say) does in historical fact overwhelm the gain (to buyers 
of wood, say, or people who live in wooden houses).  Or, to speak from behind the 
veil of ignorance, it becomes impossible to argue that one would prefer to enforce 
rules leading to the $3 society rather than to the $137 one.
Some intellectuals look with suspicion on globalization, and focus on its 
losers such as Jonson the Swedish competitor of Svenson, or Wrightman the English 
competitor of Swedish timber, and especially focus on the impoverished employees 
in the activities that lose.  They conclude that economic growth has had 
unconscionable costs.  The historical sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein, a man of the 
left, declared in 1983 that “It is simply not true that capitalism as a historical system 
has represented progress over the various previous historical systems that it 
destroyed or transformed.”36  Such is the theme of the historians Kenneth Pomeranz 
and Steven Topik in their brilliant economic-historical collage, The World That Trade  
Created (2006; a new edition of a 1999 book).  In the book they warmly commend, 
36   Wallerstein 1983 (1995), p. 98.
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among numerous other opponents of innovation, “village elders [in twentieth-
century China] who had banned a more efficient sickle on the grounds that its 
benefits were not worth the new struggles it would touch off between farmers, hired 
harvesters, and thieves.”37  That sounds nice.  
But it’s not.  If envy and local interest and keeping the peace between users of 
old and new technologies are allowed to call the shots, innovation and the modern 
world is blocked.  If bourgeois dignity and liberty are not on the whole embraced by 
public opinion, the enrichment of the poor doesn’t happen.  The older suppliers win. 
Everyone else loses.  You work at your grandfather’s job in the field or factory 
instead of going to university.  We remain contentedly—or not so contentedly—at 
$3 a day.  The poor remain unspeakably poor.  
By 1800 in northwestern Europe, for the first time in economic history, an 
important part of public opinion, especially elite opinion, came to accept creative 
accumulation and destruction in the economy, in the same way as it was doing in 
the parallel world of non-economic ideas.  The resulting change certainly did 
represent progress over the various previous historical systems that it destroyed or 
transformed, because it introduced rule utilitarianism or constitutional political 
economy into the affairs of ordinary life.  People were willing to change jobs and 
allow technology to progress.  People stopped attributing this man’s riches or that 
woman’s poverty to politics or witchcraft.  They came to what the novelist Philip 
Roth calls “a civilized person’s tolerant understanding of the puzzle of inequality 
37   Pomeranz and Topik 2006, pp. 134-135.
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and misfortune.”38  Or at least they shifted away from a belief in highly personal 
politics and witchcraft, such as in the early seventeenth century provoked the 
burning of thousands of witches along the German borderlands with France, 
towards a disenchanted belief in the impersonal, such as Them or the Government 
or the Invisible Hand or That’s Just How It Is.
Accepting creative accumulation and destruction, it turned out, provided a 
near-guarantee that almost all the boats rose on its tide.  You didn’t even need a 
boat.  Pomeranz and Topik are not wrong to note the exploitation when, say, rising 
demand for binding twine to bale American wheat straw led to Mayans and Yaqui 
Indians being bound in the Yucatán to harvest cactus to make the twine.39  But they 
are often wrong in assigning (without argument) the exploitation to the innovation 
itself rather than to the pre-capitalist structures of power that allowed the tyrants to 
exploit the opportunity to trade in twine or coffee or sugar or rubber.  Such pre-
existing evils, exploited in other ways before the evil market appeared, were often 
enough eroded by capitalism itself---if by nothing else than by the sheer rise of 
world incomes per head and the political power to ordinary folk that it brought in 
its train.  And the liberal bourgeoisie, after all, supported early and uniquely the 
ending of slavery, as in the British Empire in 1833, and the protections for free 
speech, in the American First Amendment in 1789, and the various other liberties 
overturning the ancien régime in the French Revolution of that same fruitful year.  
38   Roth 2006, p. 101.
39   Pomeranz and Topik 2006, pp. 131-132.
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In other words, anti-globalization writers such as Pomeranz and Topik 
(among many of my left-wing friends) have less interest than they should in the 
gigantic gains from bourgeois dignity and liberty.  Nowhere in a long book do they 
acknowledge the leap from $3 to $137, or even the more widespread leap from $3 to 
$30.  The historians of the world that trade created do not acknowledge the largest 
economic event in world history since the domestication of plants and animals, 
happening in the middle of their story.  An elephant sits in the middle of the room, 
yet Pomeranz and Topik speak only of the disturbances to the surrounding 
glassware.  Nowhere in their book do they note that we were once all poor and now 
many of us are rich, and the Top 5 ½ Billion are on the way to riches, with some 
hope even for the Bottom Billion.  Pomeranz’ and Topik’s own ancestors were $3-a-
day folk, like yours and mine.  The detested capitalism permitted the descendents—
Pomeranz and Topik and McCloskey, for example—to specialize in the arcania of 
Chinese or Latin American or British economic history instead of cooking potatoes 
or mending shoes.  Someone who imbibed their world history from Pomeranz and 
Topik neat would have no idea that such a shrinkage of world poverty had 
happened.
We all—my left- and my right-wing friends and I together—want the poor to 
do well.  No one of sense cares for example how splendidly the good folk of Fisher 
Island, Florida are doing in their mansions.  True, the right wing is often reluctant to 
admit that the conservative institutions it admires with such affecting piety are often 
instruments of class or racial or gender domination, such as a Harvard 
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discriminating against Jews from the 1920s on, or the hospitals segregating their 
wards and leaving the jazz singer Bessie Smith to die in 1937 on the way to a remote 
Negroes-only hospital.40  But the left wing in turn, ably represented here by 
Pomeranz and Topik, is often reluctant to admit that bourgeois innovation, not 
government protection or union organization, made most poor people 1800 to the 
present massively better off.  It has.  
Or, to look at it the other way, the anti-globalization, anti-modernization 
writers have less interest than they should in the misery of traditional, $3-a-day 
societies, in which village elders decide on the design of sickles, and of marriages, 
and of laws.  Wallerstein claimed in 1983 that he did not “seek to paint [an] idyll of 
the worlds before historical capitalism,” but went on to deny (in an argument he 
admitted was “audacious”) the evident progress in the material and spiritual 
condition of ordinary people worldwide since 1800.41  We must not allow such a 
grim threnody for the world we have lost to deafen us to the cheerful epithalamia 
for the world we have gained.  Mill complained in 1848 about the reactionary 
version of the threnody then forming in the writings of Benjamin Disraeli and Mill’s 
friend Thomas Carlyle (in this as in many other respects the recent far left rehearses 
the arguments of the old far right): in “the theory of dependence and protection . . . 
the lot of the poor . . . should be regulated for them, not by them. . . .  This is the ideal 
of the future, in the minds of those whose dissatisfaction with the present assumes 
40   Karabel 2005, Chp. 3, “Harvard and the Battle over Restriction.”
41   Wallerstein 1983 (1995), p. 100.
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the form of affection and regret towards the past.”42  Or as Bastiat put it about the 
same time, against the notion that "the government should know everything and 
foresee everything in order to manage the lives of the people, and the people need 
only let themselves be taken care of. . . .  Nothing is more senseless than to base so 
many expectations on the state, that is, to assume the existence of collective wisdom 
and foresight after taking for granted the existence of individual imbecility and 
improvidence."43  Conservatives and progressives alike suppose that village elders 
or members of the French Assembly are better suited to deciding on innovation than 
are mere peasants noting the advantages of a better sickle.  
But in the event, by the new, egalitarian, anti-expert, pro-bourgeois talk (or 
“self-dependence,” as Mill called it), a positive-sum game was freed to some extent 
from zero-sum politics.  The idea of progress through bourgeois dignity and liberty 
took hold of the social imaginary of the West.  Napoleon’s armies saw it as their first 
duty after a conquest to abolish the monopolizing guilds.  In 1857 the Danish Sound 
Tolls, which for centuries had been collected from Hamlet’s Helsingør (“Elsinore,” 
said Shakespeare), were eliminated by international treaty.  By the middle of the 
nineteenth century both Britain and France were free-trade nations.44  And all were 
on their way to bourgeois enrichment.
   
42   Mill 1871, Bk. IV, Chp. vii, sec. 1.  It is the same in the first, 1848 edition, and was much influenced then (Mill 
says in his Autobiography) by the thought of Harriet Taylor.
43   Bastiat 1845, II.15.58-59.
44   Nye 2007.
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   *       *       *       *
I am claiming, in other words, that the historically unique economic growth 
on the order of a factor of ten or sixteen or higher, and its political and spiritual 
correlates, depended on ideas more than on economics.  “During its rule of scarce 
one hundred years,” wrote Marx and Engels in The Communist Manifesto of 1848, 
“the bourgeoisie has created more massive and colossal productive forces than have 
all preceding generations.”  True, and in the next hundred years it created much 
more, with a consequent improvement of the formerly poor—quite contrary to what 
Marx and Engels anticipated.  But ideas, not mere trade or investment or 
exploitation, did the creating.  The leading ideas of the bourgeoisie itself and 
especially the new idea of its fellow citizens to resolve to speak kindly of the 
bourgeoisie were two: that the liberty to hope was a good idea and that a faithful 
economic life accords dignity and even honor to ordinary people, to My Lord 
Cheeseman as much as to Your Grace the Duke of Leicester.  The disturbing 
outcomes of such a bizarre egalitarianism, many Europeans came to believe, should 
be encouraged.  To use the word Marx taught us, the modern world arose out of an 
entirely new “ideology.”  Or, equivalently, it arose out of an entirely new “rhetoric,” 
which is an older word meaning about the same thing.  For example, the word 
“honest,” which in Shakespeare’s time meant mainly noble (that is, honorable in an 
aristocratic way, achieved in battle or at court), changed its rhetoric in the eighteenth 
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century to mean mainly truth-telling (that is, reliable in a bourgeois way, achieved 
by innovation and marketing).  The same shift took place at the same time in other 
Germanic and Romance languages of commerce, such as Dutch or Italian.45  
In the human realm “the great chain of being”(scala naturae: the staircase of 
nature), dominating the Elizabethan world picture, was the inherited yet endlessly 
refreshed hierarchy of dignities ruling since the first large-scale agricultural societies 
in Iraq and Egypt and north China or for that matter Hawaii.46  It began to break 
down.  For reasons that are not completely clear, there was a shrinkage in what 
sociologists call “social distance” (to use the terminology of Georg Simmel, its 
originator, and the Americans Robert Park and Emory Bogardus early in the 
twentieth century).47  To apply a modern analogy, European society lurched away 
from, say, old Korean or South Asian levels of deference towards rank and started 
down the road to new American or Israeli levels.  They did not, to put it mildly, get 
all the way.  But European barons and bishops reluctantly moved over a little for 
townspeople, and at length even for plowmen.  Ordinary Europeans got a dignity 
and liberty that the proud man’s contumely had long been devoted to suppressing. 
In the revolutionary year of 1795 the poet and plowman Robert Burns declared that 
“The pith o' sense, an' pride o' worth,/ Are higher rank than a' that. . . ./ A man’s a 
man for a’ that.”  The townspeople lost their grip on cozy medieval monopolies, but 
45   A fuller discussion of the illuminating vagaries of the word “honest” is given in McCloskey, forthcoming, The 
Bourgeois Revaluation. 
46   Tillyard 1943.  Members of the school of literary critics known as the New Historicists, for whom Tillyard is a 
whipping boy, point out that the Great Chain acquired its meaning from the challenges to it, Caliban challenging 
Ariel so to speak.  Orthodoxy implies a heterodoxy to be worried about, and suppressed.
47   See Ethington 1997; an economist’s use of such ideas is Akerlof 1997.
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got in exchange a new dignity as innovators, and a lower social distance from the 
elite.  They became the new heroes of a more and more bourgeois-respecting society. 
In a striking remark in 1908 Simmel focused on the old image of the 
bourgeois: “In the whole history of economic activity the stranger makes his 
appearance everywhere as a trader, and the trader makes his as a stranger.”48  An 
instance from the fourteenth century is Boccaccio’s tale of Saladin disguised as a 
merchant (in forma di mercatante).  But a new rhetoric of non-strangeness, a dignity 
for trading and innovating in ordinary life, arose around 1600 in Holland, later in 
England, and still later in other places down to the present.  It had of course causes 
itself.  Some of the causes were economic and material, surely; but some were 
rhetorical and ideal.  Certainly the immense payoff from positive-sum politics could 
inspire direct imitation, as it has in present-day India.  Matter then could be said to 
have moved other matter, interests to have spawned new interests.  The success of 
commercial Holland stuck in the craw of English people the way that the success of 
innovative Hong Kong and Taiwan stuck in the craw of mainland Chinese people, 
and inspired them to imitate.49  By contrast, “conservation of the old modes of 
production in unaltered form” (as Marx and Engels wrote in 1848) “was . . . the first 
condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes.”50  “Sticking in the craw” is 
not quite “the modes of production,” but you could call it if you want a case of 
material interests implying material interests.  
48   Quoted in Ethington 1997.
49   The evidence for how much it stuck for the English in the seventeenth century is reviewed in Appleby 1978, 
Chapter 4, “The Dutch as a Source of Evidence.”
50   ***Marx and Engels 1848, p. NN.
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Yet Marx erred in claiming (as he sometimes did) that ideological or 
rhetorical change always reflects the material economy of interests.  It was no 
material interest that drove Hitler’s or Stalin’s or Mao’s regime to murder tens of 
millions of its own people, or Pol Pot’s to murder about a third of the Cambodian 
population.51  It was ideology, during the century of conflicting ideologies. 
Doubtless the ideas themselves had some partial dependence on interests.  But not 
always.  In the crucial early case from 1600 to 1800 in northwestern Europe the 
words and ideas led the way.  European revolutions, reformations, renaissances, and 
especially revaluations made townspeople bold and raised them in the estimation of 
their fellows.  They arrived at the “bourgeois dignity and liberty” of my title.  The 
material economy followed.
51   Otteson 2006, p. 178.
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